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Summary 
This paper investigates the relative impact of regional energy production on the 
legislative choices of Russian Duma deputies on energy regulation between 1994 and 
2003. We apply Poole’s optimal classification method of roll call votes using an ordered 
probit model to explain energy law reform in the first decade of Russia’s democratic 
transition. Our goal is to analyze the relative importance of home energy on deputies’ 
behavior, controlling for other factors such as party affiliation, electoral mandate, 
committee membership and socio-demographic parameters. We observe that energy 
resource factors have a considerable effect on deputies’ voting behavior. On the other 
hand, we concurrently find that regional economic preferences  are constrained by the 
public policy priorities of the federal center that continue to set the tone in energy law 
reform in post-Soviet Russia.  
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I. Introduction 
The formation of the State Duma was a crucial parameter of Russia’s transition to 
democracy. It signaled a major shift in Russian political development and institutional 
structures, because it facilitated the emergence of new actors, seeking to set the rules of political 
play and, therefore, maximize their welfare.  Market reform has been the outcome of 
presidential initiatives rather than proposals submitted by deputies (Mau 1998: 101-105). The 
State Duma is not an autonomous public policy player in Russian federal politics, because it is 
not able to enforce any policy measures without presidential approval; the reason for this is that 
the 1993 Constitution was designed by extra-constitutional actors with de facto executive 
authority. Still, the Duma is the most powerful internal constraint to presidential power both in 
pragmatic and constitutional terms.   
Explaining the role of parliamentary institutions requires an analytical approach 
encompassing both individual strategies and collective interests. The economics of institutions 
proposes an equilibrium model, which defines institutional change in terms of objectives, the 
allocation of property rights and the reduction of transaction costs (Smith 2001: 10-15). This 
approach provides a conceptual framework for understanding the institutional dynamics leading 
to the creation of legislatures.  
Why is it interesting to focus on Russia? The energy industry is the most important 
sector of the contemporary Russian economy. In 2002 it possessed one fourth of the GDP, one 
third of the commodity production in Russian industry, one half of federal budget returns and 
more than 56 percent of Russian exports (Russian Bureau of Economic Analysis 2004). The   3
management of energy resources has been a pillar of state economic policy and political 
competition in post-Soviet Russia. It has affected the comparative competitiveness of energy 
companies both at the domestic and the international level. For most of the energy companies, 
which were established in the privatization and post-privatization period, the transfer of public 
property was the result of a proper arrangement among pivotal centers of power: this was the 
case for Lukoil and Surgutneftegas.  Thus, it is highly relevant to assess the legislative politics 
of energy regulation. We can expect that powerful interest groups may influence the bargaining 
strategies of both sides: the executive and the legislative. Particularly in the case of Gazprom, 
the fact that it constitutes the world’s biggest natural gas monopoly and exporter indicates the 
strategic importance of its reform; the reform of Gazprom has to be in line with the projected 
increase in Russia’s natural gas exports and, thus, its further support of the federal budget. 
Looking at the past 10 years, one could hypothesize that the State Duma preferred to pursue a 
pro-state and anti-reformist agenda as opposed to the market-oriented agenda of the Russian 
Government.  
The purpose of this paper is to elaborate on the legislative dimensions of market reform 
in the Russian energy sector. It aims to help one understand the extrapolation of energy factors 
that have determined legislative choices on energy regulation and privatization controlling in a 
multivariate framework for several factors.  
In addition, our paper provides several novel findings and a new framework not offered, 
to our knowledge, in previous research. First, we observe a lack of empirical evidence in the 
field of energy regulation that investigates the impact of regional conditions on deputies’ voting 
behavior. Second, we work with a new data set that has not been explored so far. Our data set   4
allows investigating the First, Second and Third Duma, looking therefore at a relatively long 
and dynamic period. Each Duma provides a different setting due to a change in the profile of 
energy roll call votes. Investigating all three Dumas also provides the great advantage to 
investigate the impact of regional conditions in different environments. Moreover, our data set 
provides a relatively rich set of control variables covering aspects such as deputies’ party 
affiliation, electoral mandate, committee membership, gender and regional origin. We are also 
able to control for party switches during a Duma. Third, we provide in a novel manner a way to 
investigate quantitatively deputies’ behavior on a set of roll calls.  
Our paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 the constitutional and political powers of 
the State Duma are presented and elaborated and the profile of major energy roll call votes 
between 1994 and 2003 is used as an explanatory pattern for understanding the parliamentary 
parameters of energy market reform in Russia. In Section 3, the literature review and the set of 
hypotheses are provided, while in Section 4 our hypotheses are operationalized by an 
econometric model and our methodology is clarified by the data evaluation process. Section 5 
provides the empirical results and Section 6 finishes with some concluding remarks on the 
political and economic role of regional resources in energy regulation at the legislative level.  
 
II. The Constitutional Role of the State Duma and the Profile of Energy Roll Call 
Votes on Key Issues 
 
  The State Duma is the main legislative body in Russia. All federal law bills must be 
submitted to the Duma and adopted with a majority vote before they are considered by the   5
Council of Federation, the Upper Chamber of the Federal Assembly, and the President. In 
addition, the State Duma has major non-legislative capacities; it can appoint and dismiss the 
Chairman of the Russian Central Bank, the Human Rights Commissioner, and the Chairman of 
the Office of Auditors and half of its members (article 103 of the Russian Constitution). The 
State Duma confirms the appointment of the prime minister, although it does not have the power 
to confirm Government ministers. The deregulation of the Russian oil sector in the mid-1990s 
and the ongoing reform of Gazprom and RAO UESR, which continued to maintain a natural 
monopoly status in their main areas of economic activity, were approved by the State Duma. 
The respective bills became sources of intense multilevel bargaining, transcending institutional, 
political, and ideological boundaries. The preservation of Gazprom’s monopoly and vertically 
integrated structure combined with direct and detailed price regulation both served the 
Government’s long-term interests and protected consumers from arbitrary monopoly prices. The 
division of the Russian electricity market into competitive and monopoly segments, as 
illustrated in the reform proposal adopted by the Duma in March 2003 enabled the state 
administration to grant the right of market entry and, thus, regulate market competition 
(Butyrkin 2003: 10-11). The State Duma passes a bill only when an absolute majority of the 
total number of its members votes for it in three consecutive readings. The energy roll calls of 
the First Duma entailed extensive negotiations on the ownership status and privatization of the 
oil and gas sector, handled issues of electricity tarification and supply, and sparked critical 
debates on the regulation of natural monopolies. The INDEM database (Satarov and 
Blagoveshenskii 2003) reports that for the 1994-1995 period the basic law drafts on energy 
policy were the following:i the bill on oil and gas, the bill on the regulation of natural   6
monopolies and the bill on electricity tariffs. In all cases, when the amendments proposed by 
an opposition or pro-governmental deputy were accepted and subsequently incorporated to the 
bill, the roll call procedure was used. Deputies were required to pass the amended bill in three 
consecutive readings before they forwarded it to the Federation Council. This may explain why 
the Federal Laws on Oil and Gas, Natural Monopolies and Electricity Tariffs constitute 
documents of great political value: not only do they reflect clashes of interests and ideological 
cleavages, which are strongly correlated with Russia’s early transition to democracy, but they 
also signal the emergence of powerful oil oligarchs whose entrepreneurial activities were central 
to the post-Soviet variety of state-led capitalism. The energy law bills in the First Duma were 
conceived and designed by the presidential administration and the lack of logrolling strategies 
or critical bill amendments by the communist or centrist opposition indicates the full-fledged 
dominance of President Yeltsin’s Party of Russian Unity. 
 The implementation of radical economic reforms in 1994 and 1995 abruptly introduced the 
concepts of property rights and market organization. The reform of the oil sector was a key 
stage in the massive privatizations in post-Soviet Russia. The State Duma voted for private 
access to public resources and linked market forces to state regulation (Nureev 2003 Part II: 
116-118). Nevertheless, the use of executive decrees under article 90 of the 1993 Constitution 
and the confirmatory, rather than substantive, role of the Duma in policy-making deprived 
energy reforms of a solid democratic foundation (Moser 2001: 169). Reformers in the executive 
perceived the reform of the oil sector as their own privilege. In addition, the increased number 
of party fractions in the First Duma may have slowed down the legislative process, but it did not 
give an opportunity to parliamentary minorities to manipulate energy roll call votes as veto   7
opportunities against the government (Doering 2004: 90). The Federal Laws on Natural 
Monopolies, State Regulation of Energy Tariffs, and Gas Supply voted on in 1995 were efforts 
to formulate an efficient regulatory framework for natural monopolies at the federal level 
(Tsapelik 2000: 5-6). However, most of the serious problems related to regulatory and reform 
strategies in the oil, gas and electricity sectors remained unresolved. In particular, the Federal 
Law on Natural Monopolies did not encourage further investment activity in the energy sector.  
In its second term, the Russian Duma evolved as an independent player and undertook major 
legislative initiatives on energy policy issues. Tax obligations and the privatization of Gazprom, 
the privatization of Slavneft and Rosneft and the role of Anatolii Chubais in the nascent 
electricity reform constitute the political-economic axes of the State Duma reform agenda. 
Specifically, the Russian Lower Chamber voted for a bill that prevented the disintegration of 
Gazprom, in spite of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund. By approving this law 
bill, the State Duma signaled its intention of keeping gas prices low and protecting Gazprom’s 
state monopoly (Satarov and Blagoveshenskii 2003).  
The Third Duma which was elected in December 1999 continued to demonstrate its veto power 
over the key reform initiatives of the Russian Government. The preference of the Duma 
majority for the preservation of RAO UESR as a natural monopoly was evident. The State 
Duma also voted for the enforcement of a new tariff-setting system in the oil sector in order to 
make Russian oil companies, vertically integrated and structured as holdings, sell oil at the 
market price, and not at the lower domestic price. This practice resulted in lower tax revenues 
for the Russian Government (a loss of about 15 billion rubles), because this practice lowered the 
taxable revenues of Russian oil companies.  The regulatory role of the Federal Energy   8
Commission was harshly criticized in the beginning of the most important month for Russian 
electricity reform, February 2003. Deputies underscored the fact that the Regional Energy 
Commissions had increased energy tariffs 14 percent over the legal limit and therefore violated 
article 1 of the respective law.  They criticized Federal Energy Commission actions that ordered 
its regional counterparts to increase domestic energy prices and abandon cross subsidization. In 
their viewpoint, this decision exceeded the jurisdictional limits of the Federal Commission, 
because it was associated with deeply political implications. However, no law bill on energy 
policy in all 10 years of the Russian Duma was as contested as the law bill on electricity reform. 
Before its final approval on February 21, 2003, it received 70 amendments.ii Voting against 
electricity reform was regarded as anti-privatization and anti-monopoly act. The legislated 
amendments of the Russian Civil Code as well as of the Federal Law on Natural Monopolies 
constitute supplementary signals of the Duma’s final agreement with the presidential reform; 
however, they do not diminish the political significance of the Duma’s initial opposition to the 
project as well as its institutional role as the safeguard of Russian statehood. It can be inferred 
that the Russian legislature perceived energy reforms since 1996 as an effort of Russian and 
foreign corporate elites to consolidate their market power through the politicization of energy 
regulation (Shakhmalov 2003: 395-397). 
In seeking to explain the regional resource dynamics of energy reform in post-Soviet Russia, 
one must bear in mind the difference between its institutional and political-economic dimension. 
The institutional dimension is connected with the formal actors involved in the decision-making 
process. The political-economic dimension of energy reform encompasses the regional 
component of energy regulation, but it also has a broader range. It must take into account the   9
multifaceted interactions of Russian deputies with influential business actors, not only at the 
local but also at the federal level; the latter usually intend to implement their own economic 
agenda by integrating their corporate strategies into larger political objectives. 
 
III. Literature and Hypotheses  
 
  The role of interest groups in the formation of public policy decisions reached by 
legislative institutions has been extensively analyzed in the literature. As Nunez and Rosenthal 
(2004) indicate in their study on the impact of private interests and ideology on bankruptcy roll 
calls, the fear of retaliation in the form of campaign financial cuts motivated the legislators to 
support bankruptcy law bills, which boosted the financial interests of businessmen. Procreditor 
voting implies the strong presence of deputies financed by private interests that benefit from it. 
Nevertheless, given the agnostic character of our dependent variable, ideology is not taken for 
granted in our article. Similarly, the existence of high rates in oil, gas and electricity production 
implies strong interest groups, which do not necessarily have to have the form of corporate 
organization. Adams (1996) underscores that deputies elected in multi-member districts tend to 
be much more diverse in their legislative preferences than deputies elected in single-member 
districts, where the factors of party discipline and dependence are much stronger than regional 
economic interests. Adams’s observation is in line with the expectation one may have about the 
Russian electoral system and its consequences on the composition of the State Duma. Because 
225 deputies are elected with the PR system and 225 deputies with the SMD system, it is 
extremely interesting to map the conflict between local interest groups and party ideology in the   10
framework of Russia’s turbulent parliamentary setting. Furthermore, the political importance 
of committee membership is usually associated with the nature of law bills to be approved; 
committees involved in public works, foreign affairs, energy, or financial law bills are usually 
composed by members, who want to reap benefits for their constituencies and therefore increase 
their probability of re-election (Adler and Lapinski 1997: 913-914). In a study on the economic 
policy preferences of the transitional Chilean legislature, Baldez and Carey (1999) find 
empirical support that bargaining between deputy groups supporting an increase in executive 
spending and those who oppose defines Chile’s democratic transformation. They contend that 
this tendency is differentiated from what is usually observed in post-authoritarian societies, 
where the executive is successful in increasing its political and economic rents overcoming the 
obstacles of formal democratic procedures. Carey (2003) argues that collective action among 
legislators requires party discipline and sacrifice of individual over collective interests. In his 
view, the weakening of party discipline and the responsiveness of deputies to citizens’ demands 
is entangled with democratization of legislative organization and procedure. This is an 
observation that holds for the post-communist legislature of Russia; nevertheless, if deputies 
become business rather than party agents-as they used to be before-, it is very unlikely that this 
new constellation of interests is going to improve transparency and quality of democratic 
governance for the benefit of people.  
Covington and Bargen (2004) claim that in modern democracies majority parties are likely to 
control the legislative agenda in modern democracies and they try to make the point that the 
floor-median member is a factor less taken into account. This is in line with what Cox and Poole 
argue (2002); party discipline is a crucial predictor of voting behavior in all but one Congress   11
between 1877 and 1999. Nevertheless, their analyses do not make any difference between the 
policy areas discussed in committee and plenary sessions. In addition, logrolling mechanisms in 
consecutive law bill readings, both in committee and plenary sessions, may account for the 
impact of regional interests on the legislators’ voting choices (Poole and Rosenthal 1997, Fleck 
and Kilby 2002). As Remington argues (2006), Russian political parties are not characterized by 
uniformity in discipline and ideological cohesion. Variation in discipline and ideological 
consistency across parties of the State Duma increases the political cost for the formation of 
pro-presidential coalitions, when critical law bills are considered. Electoral mandate can affect 
power distribution among legislators, regional businessmen and the executive; transfer of 
legislators’ incentives from voters to local interest groups undermines their ability to check on 
the political appropriateness and legitimacy of acts held by the public administration, as shown 
in the case of the Argentinean legislature (Jones et al. 2002). The existence of ideological bias in 
parliamentary sessions and interest groups represented by deputies in those sessions is not clear 
and there is no indisputable empirical evidence in that direction (Kollman 1997). McFaul (2001) 
makes an interesting point when he says that either by liquidating the presidency and promoting 
a two-party system or by abandoning proportional representation and therefore creating a two-
party system Russia could find a stable path in its own party development. It is understandable 
that this proposal is very unlikely to occur, because neither Russia’s regional diversity nor its 
strong executive tradition can allow such a political and institutional outcome.  
Our approach is consistent with that of Poole and Rosenthal (1996), when they argue that the 
legislators’ voting behavior cannot be interpreted with the median voter theorem; on the 
contrary, opportunistic party coalitions on specific roll call votes or general ideological   12
constraints can be the most efficient patterns for explaining legislative behavior in a multi-
dimensional space. In parallel, the separation of purposes presented by Samuels and Shugart 
(2003) may fit in the Russian parliamentary system. Despite the strong centralization of regional 
and local powers toward the federal center and the perception of energy regulation as the main 
determinant of Russia’s foreign economic policy, we observe the creation of two different forms 
of accountability for the executive and the legislative branches of power. Policy switches occur, 
when the president intends to impose a law bill that comes in major conflict with regional 
interests represented in the Duma or the political career objectives of fractional leaders. The 
neutralization of legislative opposition and the fragmentation of the party specter in the third 
term of the State Duma as argued by Smyth (2002) cannot imply any lack of political 
contestation in the Russian parliament; in key energy roll call votes where the presidential 
administration intended to impose its own regulatory preferences in energy policy, there was a 
consistent opposition by both pro-presidential and anti-presidential parties, that demanded and 
succeeded the partial modification of the initial law bill through informal negotiations. In 
addition, energy law reform is directly not captured by policy-making priorities at the federal 
level, but it is mainly entangled with major developmental considerations at the regional level.  
  Talbert and Potoski (2002) are correct in finding the pre-legislative negotiations entail a 
much higher dimensionality than floor discussion and readings of the law bills.  We treat our 
dependent variable as a single-dimensional axis, whose extremes are pro- and anti-reform 
voting behavior. Thus, given the literature described above, we come up with the following set 
of hypotheses:    13
Deputies from energy-rich constituencies are more likely to vote against energy law reform 
than deputies from energy-poor constituencies.  
  Regions with larger oil, gas and electricity production are more likely to have business 
leaders, who pursue intensive lobbying activities vis-à-vis the local political authorities. Given 
the widespread entanglement of business with formal political leadership-both executive and 
legislative-at the regional level, it is expected that SMD deputies are less inclined to support any 
form of reform in the ownership status of Russia’s energy industries; their political and 
economic rents would then be substantially reduced, because involvement of foreign investors, 
transfer of decision-making processes from the regions to the federal center and promotion of 
transparency in regulatory practices certainly undermine the control of their regional patrons 
over regional energy resources.  
Deputies from oil-rich constituencies tend to make opposite legislative choices on energy policy 
bills from deputies elected in gas-rich constituencies.  
  The profiles of the oil and gas industries in Russia are crucially different. The oil 
industry was fully privatized during Duma’s first term, while Gazprom is up to this point a state 
monopoly. Thus, we contend that SMD deputies supported by oil industry interests would prefer 
the reduction of state ownership in the energy sector, because this could facilitate the 
participation of Russian and foreign oil companies operating within Russia in gas and electricity 
production. On the other hand, SMD deputies originating from regions where increased gas 
production implies a strong corporate involvement of Gazprom into regional politics are less 
inclined to support legislative initiatives advancing private sector development in Russian 
energy markets.    14
Deputies who are members of the energy legislative committee are more likely to oppose 
energy law reform than those who are not.   
  Energy committee membership is entangled with the discussion, design and preliminary 
approval of energy law bills at the committee level. Given that the overall majority of energy 
law bills have been connected with the partial or full-scale opening of oil, gas and electricity 
markets, committee members who drafted these bills by majority voting are very likely to have 
been negative toward energy market reform during the time continuum between 1994 and 2003. 
Since there is no information on internal committee decision-making processes, it is not possible 
to run the OC method to rank committee members based on their voting choices during the 
various energy committee sessions.  
 
IV. Research Design  
The Model 
To test whether regional conditions affect deputies voting behavior, we propose the following 
baseline equation:  
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where i indexes the deputies in the sample. VBi measures deputies’ voting behavior. As each 
Duma provides a different setting influenced by the profile of energy roll call votes, we need to 
clarify the interpretation the dependent variable for all three Dumas. In the First Duma, a higher   15
value can be interpreted as a stronger pro-reformist behavior. The same also holds for the 
Third Duma. On the other hand, a higher value in the Second Duma is correlated with a stronger 
anti-reform tendency. REGi denotes the regional conditions of a deputy. We measure the energy 
significance at the regional level taking the ratios of the oil, gas and electricity production in 
every region over the aggregate quantity of oil, gas and electricity productions in Russian 
Federation. COMi is a dummy variable that distinguishes between those deputies who are 
members of Duma’s energy policy committee and those who are not (Table A2 for a list of the 
different committees).  
The regression also contains several control variables. The first set distinguishes the deputies 
according to their electoral mandate-either proportional representation or single-member district 
(VRi), the second set makes the distinction according to their party affiliation (PAi). Because 
the creation of ten dummy variables would be neither practical nor efficient, we divide the 
Russian political parties into three categories based on their official political platforms: Center, 
Left and Right (see Appendix Table A1). We also create a fourth category for independent 
deputies who keep a non-party affiliated stance throughout the term.  Party coherence is a very 
powerful tool in understanding general voting dynamics at the legislative level (PS). Energy law 
bills, because of their crucial political weight, have been in the epicenter of fierce inter- and 
intraparty contestations and therefore the cause of party dissolutions; the floating ideological 
character of the Russian party system can account for these developments. The governmental 
efforts to dismantle Gazprom during the second term of the Russian Duma combined with the 
restructuring of RAO UESR, which caused a serious clash within the pro-presidential party 
coalition, redefined the party map of the Russian Duma. Controlling for the impact of these   16
radical changes is certainly enlightening the regional economic dimensions of energy 
regulation, since it indicates the extensions of regional economic constraints in Russia’s federal 
parliamentary politics. The demographic variables (DEMi, age and gender) may also have 
policy implications on the way age and gender differences react ceteris paribus to energy bills 
promoting liberalization and investment in Russia’s energy markets. It also helps to measure the 
heterogeneity of the deputies. Finally, εi denotes the error term.  
Data Evaluation Process   
  This paper examines the voting behavior of Duma members on roll call votes dealing 
with energy in the Russian Duma between 1994 and 2003. Our research would not have been 
possible without the roll call database of INDEM Foundation in Moscow (see Satarov and 
Blagoveshenskii 2003). Roll calls covered the three first post-communist terms of the Russian 
Duma (1994-1995, 1996-1999 and 2000-2003). Three respective roll call matrices were created 
including the binary choices of each deputy. The first roll call matrix included 51, the second 
196 and the third 202 votes. Following Poole’s methodology (Poole 2005), we set 0.5 percent as 
the minimum proportion on the minority side of a roll call. Furthermore, we define 10 as the 
minimum number of roll calls in which a deputy has to be vote in order to be included in the 
scaling.iii The data assigns a unique number to every deputy and provides information on his 
party affiliation, the electoral system he was elected on and his regional origin, if he was elected 
on the SMD system. The Russian Constitution mentions explicitly that the State Duma must 
have 450 members. For each of the three terms the database contains more than 450 deputies, 
because some deputies were obliged by natural or legal reasons to abdicate their parliamentary 
membership. The majority of them resigned to take another public office which by the 1993   17
Constitution is incompatible with a legislator’s seat. In sum, 465 people served as deputies of 
Russia’s first democratic Duma, 491 people in the Second Duma, and 479 in the Third Duma. 
Our goal is to analyze the relative importance of regional factors on deputies’ behavior, 
controlling for other factors such as party affiliation, electoral mandates, committee membership 
and socio-demographic factors.  The objective of this section is to study the role of energy 
resources as determinants of energy regulation. The INDEM database provides information on 
the regional origin of SMD deputies, because regional affiliation is not deemed to be politically 
important for deputies elected on a PR basis. The method used to evaluate the energy 
significance of Russian regions takes the ratios of the oil, gas and electricity production in every 
region over the aggregate quantity of oil, gas and electricity productions in Russian 
Federation.iv In parallel, the role of party labels in regional energy politics is explained in terms 
of political development and state organization at the local level. Given that the consistent and 
active participation of Communists in local elections and the differing principles between 
gubernatorial and regional legislative elections (Hutcheson 2003: 35-37), it might be helpful to 
model the multifaceted interactions between political actors and energy entrepreneurs in energy-
rich and energy-poor Russian regions. Fluid boundaries between business and government and 
endemic phenomena of political corruption synthesize a challenging matrix of interest 
equilibriums and institutional players, both at the federal and the regional level of economic 
policy decision-making.    
To do this we consider an empirical approach based on the optimal classification method 
elaborated by Poole (1997). This method allows us to introduce a probabilistic spatial model for 
the analysis of roll call votes on oil, gas and electricity regulation.  Given that the optimal   18
classification model is a non-parametric method, there is no metric information on the 
legislators’ ideal points produced (Rosenthal and Voeten  2004: 622). Poole and Rosenthal’s 
model of Nominate Scores is the conceptual foundation for explaining the optimal classification 
method, since it constitutes its parametric alternative. The hypothesis that roll call voting can be 
captured both by a single and a two-dimensional analysis is valid for both models of deputies 
(Poole 1997: 70-85). Nevertheless, Poole’s non-parametric approach is less influenced by single 
classification errors in the legislators’ ideal points. His concern is to stress the ideological 
underpinnings of legislative behavior based on a metrically unbiased method that does not 
consider the strategic calculus of party coalitions to be in the core of parliamentary politics.  The 
roll call votes focus exclusively on oil, gas and electricity regulation. The optimal classification 
method has the objective of locating ideal points for legislators and separating hyperplanes for 
roll calls such that the number of classification errors is minimized. A classification error for a 
legislator on a roll call occurs when the legislator’s ideal point is such that his or her vote is not 
in line with the separating hyperplane for the roll call. The robustness of this procedure is 
remarkable with regard to the stochastic nature of the data. In addition, the optimal classification 
method counts equally all classification errors (Rosenthal and Voeten 2004: 622). Its single-
dimensional ranking is divided into four distinct orders (from 1 to 4) and is regressed on of 
several control variables. 
  In addition, because it can be argued that including our aggregated regional variables 
will produce downwardly biased standard errors, we address the problem of heteroscedasticity 
by presenting standard errors adjusted for clustering on Russian regions and administrative 
districts (see Figures 1 and 2, and Table A2 and A3). The advantage of this class of estimators is   19
that they do not require a precise modeling of the heteroscedasticity source. Therefore, they 
are robust to heteroscedasticity of arbitrary form. In general, cluster estimators tend to increase 
the reported standard errors by a relatively large amount, which reduces the levels of statistical 
significance for the estimated coefficients without affecting the marginal effects and the size of 
the coefficients.  
The calculation of marginal effects is pivotal for the success of our analysis. Ordered probit 
models analyze the ranking information of the scaled dependent variable. The equation of a 
(ordered) probit estimation has a non-linear form; only the sign of the coefficient can be directly 
interpreted and not its size. Calculating the marginal effects is therefore a method to find the 
quantitative effect a variable has on the dependent variable.  
It is interesting that there is no Duma representative for the republic of Chechnya; this is why 
we count one state less than the official number of the Russian federal subjects. On the contrary, 
there are deputies representing all seven Russian administrative districts.  We have to stress here 
that PR deputies have been coded as 0 in the regional factor variables; as their election is 
dependent on the party’s percentage on an all-Russian electoral basis, it is not methodologically 
consistent to assume their connection with energy interest groups in certain regions with higher 
or lower rates of oil, gas or electricity production.  
Moreover, to better evaluate the importance of energy resources we will conduct for every 
estimation a Wald-test for coefficient restrictions testing for joint significance to be able to 
conclude whether energy resources as a group play a significant role in the determination of 
Poole’s ranking. 
   20
V. Empirical Results 
 
We present the empirical results focusing independently on the First Duma (Table 1), 
Second Duma (Table 2) and Third Duma (Table 3). In every table we report estimations with 
standard errors adjusted for clustering on Russian regions or administrative districts.
1   
a) First Duma 
The parameter estimates for oil and gas production in Table 1 shows substantial 
statistical significance. The significant role of energy resources is supported looking at the chi2-
statistics showing that the null hypothesis is rejected at the 1% significance levels, which means 
that energy resources have a significant effect on deputies’ behavior in the First Duma. The 
marginal effects are also quite substantial. The different signs of oil and gas provide a perfectly 
clear signal about the policy priorities of the Russia’s deputies; to dismantle the oil industry and 
preserve the state character of the gas sector. This decision falls exactly in the scope of Russia’s 
first transitional government and the creation of a new privileged economic class both at the 
regional and the federal level.  
The high statistical significance of the Committee variable combined with the high 
marginal effects indicate that members of the energy parliamentary committee of the First 
Duma are more likely to vote pro-reform bills as opposed to the others. The appointment of the 
energy committee members should certainly not be deemed to be incidental and the outcome of 
oil industry privatization in early 1990s is the clearest indication for that.  
                                                 
1 Please see Tables A3, Parts I and II, in the appendix below.    21
b) Second Duma 
  The results in Table 2 underscores that the origin from an energy-rich or energy-poor 
Russian region did play a less important role in the voting choices of deputies; the coefficients 
of Oil, Gas and Electricity Production are statistically insignificant and the Wald-test indicates 
that the null hypothesis is only rejected in the estimations using standard error adjusted for 
clustering on Russian administrative districts. The clash between the centrist Prime Minister 
Viktor Chernomyrdin and the parties of Left, which constitutes the main political issue in the 
field of energy policy, becomes evident in the ordered probit analysis; however, it is less related 
with vested regional interests of deputies, but it is rather connected with the President’s federal 
agenda and the political reactions to it. It is interesting to notice that regional economic 
preferences seemed to be constrained by the public policy priorities of the federal center that 
continue to set the tone in energy law reform in post-Soviet Russia.  
  The Committee membership determinant is not statistically significant. It seems that in 
the Second Duma the debate over Gazprom’s dismantling cannot not be captured on the basis of 
this parameter; on the contrary, it should be seen as an issue covering multiple areas of political 
and economic contestation at all levels of legislative bargaining. It is likely that the composition 
of the energy committee was uniform either toward the pro-or the anti-reform direction and 
therefore it cannot be a significant explanatory pattern for analyzing gas regulation and the 
center-left clash over it in the second term of the Duma.  
c) Third Duma 
  In the Third Duma (see Table 3), regions are not only evaluated based on the ratio of 
local oil, gas and electricity production over the quantity of national oil, gas and electricity   22
production but also on the trade balance (exports minus imports) observed in these three 
energy markets at the regional level.  
The political contestation over electricity reform in the Third Duma and the divided 
stance of Russian centrist parties can substantially explain the high statistical significance of the 
Trade Balance variable. The Trade Balance variable refers to the difference between exports and 
imports in the oil and gas sectors and its marginal effects have a positive sign in the higher 
orders. This means that deputies originating from regions with profitable commercial activity in 
the oil and gas industries are more likely to support the RAO UESR reform. The expected 
liberalization of energy prices and the subsequent increase of electricity prices would perfectly 
optimize their economic benefits.  
In line with First Duma, the energy resource factors seemed to affect deputies voting 
behavior (even in a stronger manner). The coefficients Oil, Gas and Electricity are in most of 
the cases statistically significant. The Wald-test also shows the joint significance of the energy 
resource variables. However, compared to the First Duma, the coefficients show the reversed 
signs. Hence, deputies originating from oil-and electricity-rich regions are less inclined to vote 
for the Chubais reform, while deputies originating from gas-rich regions support the 
restructuring of the energy sector. It is self-evident that the subsequent increase in electricity 
prices that this reform would entail is beneficial, both politically and economically, for deputies, 
who have vested interested in the regional gas industry; on the contrary it is extremely harmful 
for those deputies, whose political clientele is located in regions with major electricity 
production rates. A substantial increase in electricity prices would critically undermine their 
regional political profile.    23
The Committee factor is statistically significant at the 10 percent level, but still less 
strong than in the First Duma. A possible explanation may be Luzhkov’s opposition to Anatolii 
Chubais’s restructuring plan of RAO UESR and subsequently to President Putin. This means 
that the energy committee members were representing all the specter of political and economic 
interests related to RAO UESR’s restructuring. Lesser representation in membership or 
inconsistent voting attitudes may well account for the statistical significance at the 10 percent.  
d) Control Variables 
  Taking a look at the ideology and coherence as attributes of energy law reforms, we can 
conclude that the results in the First Duma indicate that there are statistically significant 
differences between Leftist and Rightist deputies. Left oriented deputies seemed to have 
stronger anti-reformist preferences than the right oriented ones. As a consequence, it may be 
concluded that right deputies in 1994 and 1995 are more likely to support the presidential 
agenda and vote for rather than against regulatory and ownership reform in the energy sector.  
The Second Duma shows a multidimensional character of the deputies’ legislative choices. 
Interestingly, the Party Change variable is now highly statistical significant. The results in the 
Third Duma reveal the contentious politics of corporate reform in the electricity sector and at 
the same time account for the previously noted inconsistency of roll call voting in three out of 
four ideological groups.   
It seems that in the First Duma SMD deputies are less likely to maintain a higher 
position in Poole’s single dimensional ranking. However, the coefficient is not statistically 
significant. In the Second Duma SMD deputies are more likely than PR deputies to vote for 
energy bills introducing ownership liberalization and privatization in the energy sector. On the   24
other hand, the negative coefficient of SMD in the Third Duma indicates an anti-reform 
tendency. SMD deputies are less inclined to advocate the restructuring of RAO UESR than PR 
deputies, because the proposed reform lessens the power of Regional Energy Commissions and, 
therefore, their political impact on electricity tariff-setting. 
Taking a look at the socio-demographic factors we can conclude that gender differences 
are not observable. Contrary to the  First Duma, age is correlated in the Second Duma with a 
pro-reformist behavior. The elderly Russian elites are inclined to support the executive’s 
legislative initiatives for changing the ownership structure of Gazprom. Given that most of them 
were bureaucrats and public managers in the Soviet period, they perceive the privatization of 
Gazprom as a unique opportunity to maximize their economic benefits as they did in the oil 
industry. Contrary to the First Duma, we clearly observe a linear relationship between age and 
ranking position and therefore we report only the estimations with the single factor Age. In the 
Third Duma, we also find a linear relationship between age and the ranking class.  
e) Case Studies  
In this last part of our empirical analysis we intend to check the validity of our aggregate 
estimations by running a similar estimation structure as previously using probit models for 
individual roll votes. This method enables us not only to understand the underpinnings of our 
previous results at the micro-legislative level, but also to test whether the individual estimations 
for crucial roll votes in each of the three first terms of Russia’s democratic transition confirm or 
contradict the broader findings located in previous parts of the article. What we do is to analyze 
the two most crucial roll call votes during these ten years: roll call vote No. 46300
v on the   25
ownership status of Gazprom and roll call vote No. 129940 on the restructuring of RAO 
UESR. Table 4 presents the results of both roll call votes. 
  The results of the roll call vote No. 46300 indicate that deputies coming from oil-rich 
regions are less inclined to support gas reform as opposed to deputies coming from gas-rich 
regions. It seems that regional politics are certainly crucial at the individual level, which is less 
the case at the aggregated level. The breakup of Gazprom and the opening of Russian energy 
markets to foreign investors provoked a tremendous conflict of interests among deputies from 
fractions and regions with often contradictory interests. The fact that the State Duma finally 
supported the state character of Gazprom is an ample indicator that despite the presidential 
initiative and vested regional interests, the collective legislative choice of the deputies was 
aligned with a firm notion of statehood, which is apparent throughout Russian economic history.   
  Moreover, it not a surprise to observe that deputies coming from electricity-rich regions 
would be more likely to vote against this law bill, since the policy impact of the RAO UESR 
reform was going to affect analogously the regulatory power of their local energy commission.  
On the other hand, we cannot observe that committee membership matters.  Thus, it is evident 
that the composition of the committee that prepared both law bills was biased; anti-reform in the 




  Our goal was to analyze the relative importance of energy factors on deputies’ behavior, 
controlling for other factors such as party affiliation, electoral mandates, committee membership   26
and socio-demographic factors.  We have therefore intensively investigated empirically the 
role of energy resources as determinants of energy regulation using a new data set that has not 
been explored so far in the literature covering none less than three Dumas covering also a rich 
set of control variables. This allows to investigate the impact of regional conditions in a 
dynamic environment. Moreover, we provide a novel approach to investigate quantitatively 
deputies’ behavior based on a rich set of roll calls.  
We observe that energy resource factors seemed to affect deputies voting behavior. On 
the other hand, we also find that regional economic preferences are constrained by the public 
policy priorities of the federal center that continue to set the tone in energy law reform in post-
Soviet Russia. In general, it seems that deputies are likely to establish bonds of interdependence 
with regional monopolists and other entrepreneurs, given that the latter can financially support 
their electoral campaigns. The maintenance of this institutional dualism may lead to 
fragmentation of party ideology, because regional economic interests rather than party ideology 
tend to exert a higher influence on deputies. At that point, the question whether State Duma can 
act as a real representative of people’s interests becomes profound. The argument that Russia 
under Yeltsin and Putin administrations has evolved to an electoral monarchy (Shevtsova 2000) 
does not hold in the light of the quantitative analysis presented above. Besides, lobbying per se 
does not mean the end of constitutional democracy. On the contrary, the existence of pressure 
groups restores the link of deputies with society, impels private actors to control ex post 
legislative decisions, and raises the informational level of legislators (Zherebkin 2002: 61-62). 
In transitional societies such as Russia business-government relations can have this added 
dimension under the prism of evolving state and market institutions. The State Duma may be   27
regarded as an institution with a two-fold orientation: it is both a state organ and, in parallel, a 
political actor maintaining strong institutional ties with energy business. Corporate 
developments in the Russian oil sector combined with the ongoing reform planning for 
Gazprom and RAO UESR necessitated interparty and interregional coalitions, if not for the 
promotion of a common energy agenda, at least for the prevention of reform projects, which 
would be unfavorable to regional energy monopolies and cause popular disapprobation. 
Collective strategies cover a larger set of objectives and have an increased probability of 
success.  
If personal interests are more important than parties, it is worthwhile to figure out what 
the role of the former in the evolutionary course of party institutions. This is a pivotal parameter 
for understanding the intensity and perspectives of legislative intervention in business-
government relations of post-Soviet Russia. Another problem is that defining the notion of 
workable competition in Russian energy markets has not been an easy case. In the Russian 
context the establishment of competitive market structures is not connected only with the issue 
of potential market entry as opposed to narrower standards used in the past for classifying 
market concentration (Ellig and Kalt 1996: 117-118). It refers to concrete private players whose 
market entry is the outcome of a privileged relationship with state officials. This is the point, 
where State Duma intervenes with the purpose to safeguard state interests, given its own state 
and constitutional nature. What Duma tries to do is to achieve an institutional compromise 
between the colliding forces of the Russian political system: the government and the incumbent 
on the one side and the challengers on the other. It is correct that no regulatory regime can 
remove all inefficiencies: however, its performance can be improved uniquely, if corporate and   28
public actors are given incentives to reduce public and private costs in the energy industry 
and thus boost people’s welfare. Thus, the Russian Duma acts as a de facto regulator by 
contributing to the implementation of a transparent tariff-setting system and the promotion of 
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Determinants of Energy Reform in the First Duma   
Dependent Var.: Single Dimensional Ranking with the Optimal Classification Method 
     









Marg. Marg. Marg. Marg.  Marg. Marg. Marg. Marg. 
Factors Coeff.  z-Stat. 
Eff. (1) Eff. (2) Eff. (3) Eff. (4) 
Coeff. z-Stat. 
Eff. (1) Eff. (2) Eff. (3) Eff. (4)
Oil  4.048*** 2.86  -1.271 -0.343 0.416  1.199  4.048**  2.28  -1.271 -0.343 0.416  1.199 
Gas  -2.608***  -2.94 0.819 0.221 -0.268  -0.772  -2.608**  -2.25 0.819 0.221 -0.268  -0.772 
Electricity  -1.491  -0.38 0.468 0.127 -0.153  -0.442  -1.491  -0.39 0.468 0.127 -0.153  -0.442 
Committee  0.625*** 4.33  -0.157 -0.081 0.021  0.217  0.625***  5.83  -0.157 -0.081 0.021  0.217 
SMD  -0.027  -0.31 0.009 0.002 -0.003  -0.008  -0.027  -0.30 0.009 0.002 -0.003  -0.008 
Center  -0.042  -0.22 0.013 0.004 -0.004  -0.012  -0.042  -0.20 0.013 0.004 -0.004  -0.012 
Independent  -0.301  -0.97 0.103 0.015 -0.039  -0.079  -0.301  -0.79 0.103 0.015 -0.039  -0.079 
Right  -0.594***  -4.94 0.195 0.038 -0.068  -0.164  -0.594***  -5.77 0.195 0.038 -0.068  -0.164 
Woman  0.112  0.89  -0.034 -0.011 0.010  0.034  0.112  0.72  -0.034 -0.011 0.010  0.034 
Age  0.002  0.40  -0.001  0.000 0.000 0.001 0.002  0.51  -0.001  0.000 0.000 0.001 
Party  Change  -0.137  -0.98 0.044 0.011 -0.015  -0.039  -0.137  -0.90 0.044 0.011 -0.015  -0.039 
chi2-stat energy resources  8.84**                 5.42                
Number  of  obs  400         400        
Prob>chi2  0.000          0.000         
Pseudo R2  0.036                 0.036                
Notes: Robust standard errors. Significance levels: * 0.05 < p < 0.10, ** 0.01 < p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Zero party switches for Independent.  Reference 
groups: PR; Left, Man, Not changed the party, Not a members of Duma’s energy policy committee. According to the Optimal Classification output, the 
algorithm converges to 0.03959 (4%) in error proportion, to 0.96041 (96%) in correct classification, to 0.66202 (66.2%) in APRE, and the Spearman 




Determinants of Energy Reform in the Second Duma  
 
Dependent Var.: Single Dimensional Ranking with the Optimal Classification Method  
 
Clustering on Russian Regions 
 
Clustering on Russian Administrative Districts 
1-100 101-200 201-300 301-400 1-100 101-200 201-300 301-400 
Marg. Marg. Marg. Marg.  Marg. Marg. Marg. Marg. 
Factors Coeff.  z-Stat. 
Eff. (1)  Eff. (2)  Eff. (3) Eff.  (4) 
Coeff. z-Stat. 
Eff. (1)  Eff. (2)  Eff. (3) Eff.  (4) 
Oil  0.701  0.86  -0.137 -0.142 0.161  0.119  0.701  1.55  -0.137 -0.142 0.161  0.119 
Gas  0.195  0.32  -0.038 -0.040 0.045  0.033  0.195  1.13  -0.038 -0.040 0.045  0.033 
Electricity  4.137  0.85  -0.810 -0.840 0.950  0.701  4.137  0.75  -0.810 -0.840 0.950  0.701 
Committee  -0.219  -0.61 0.048 0.039 -0.054  -0.033  -0.219  -0.55 0.048 0.039 -0.054  -0.033 
SMD  -0.299** -2.31 0.058 0.060 -0.068  -0.051  -0.299**  -2.02 0.058 0.060 -0.068  -0.051 
Center  -2.589***  -6.58 0.619 0.174 -0.393  -0.400  -2.589*** -5.97 0.619 0.174 -0.393  -0.400 
Independent  -2.725*** -5.15  0.826  -0.281 -0.429 -0.117 -2.725*** -5.80  0.826  -0.281 -0.429 -0.117 
Right  -1.415***  -6.41 0.443 0.012 -0.340  -0.115  -1.415*** -6.02 0.443 0.012 -0.340  -0.115 
Woman  0.085  0.59  -0.016 -0.018 0.019  0.015  0.085  0.50  -0.016 -0.018 0.019  0.015 
Age  -0.010** -2.17 0.002 0.002 -0.002  -0.002  -0.010*  -1.88 0.002 0.002 -0.002  -0.002 
Party  Change  0.693*** 6.40  -0.106 -0.160 0.114  0.152  0.693***  6.66  -0.106 -0.160 0.114  0.152 
chi2-stat energy resources  4.89             11.14**                
Number  of  obs  466         466        
Prob>chi2  0.000          0.000         
Pseudo R2  0.287                 0.287                
 Notes: Robust standard errors. Significance levels: * 0.05 < p < 0.10, ** 0.01 < p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Reference groups: PR; Left, Man, Not changed the party, 
Not a members of Duma’s energy policy committee. According to the Optimal Classification output, the algorithm converges to 0.04288 (4.3%) in error 
proportion, to 0.95712 (95.7%) in correct classification, to 0.53441 (53.44%) in APRE, and the Spearman correlation between the current legislator estimates and 
the previous iteration estimates converges to 0.99828.   
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Table 3 
Determinants of Energy Reform in the Third Duma  
Dependent Var.: Single Dimensional Ranking with the Optimal Classification Method 
 
Clustering on Russian Regions 
 
Clustering on Russian Administrative Districts 
1-100 101-200 201-300 301-400 1-100 101-200 201-300 301-400 
Marg. Marg. Marg. Marg.  Marg. Marg. Marg. Marg. 
Factors Coeff.  z-Stat. 
Eff.  (1) Eff.  (2) Eff.  (3) Eff.  (4) 
Coeff. z-Stat. 
Eff. (1)  Eff. (2)  Eff. (3)  Eff. (4) 
Oil  -1.733*  -1.90 0.312 0.283 -0.415  -0.179  -1.733*** -3.38 0.312 0.283 -0.415  -0.179 
Gas  0.795*  1.70  -0.143 -0.130 0.191  0.082  0.795***  3.04  -0.143 -0.130 0.191  0.082 
Electricity  -8.686*  -1.72 1.562 1.419 -2.082  -0.900  -8.686*  -1.82 1.562 1.419 -2.082  -0.900 
Trade  Balance  3E-05*** 3.38  -6E-06 -5E-06 8E-06  3E-06  3E-05***  3.15  -6E-06 -5E-06 8E-06  3E-06 
Committee  0.435*  1.70  -0.062 -0.099 0.101  0.060  0.435*  1.88  -0.062 -0.099 0.101  0.060 
SMD  -0.723***  -4.71 0.132 0.113 -0.167  -0.078  -0.723*** -4.50 0.132 0.113 -0.167  -0.078 
Center  3.353*** 8.67  -0.759 -0.031 0.396  0.394  3.353***  8.32  -0.759 -0.031 0.396  0.394 
Independent  2.722*** 5.55  -0.108 -0.593 -0.106 0.807  2.722***  6.89  -0.108 -0.593 -0.106 0.807 
Right  3.202*** 11.66  -0.183 -0.624 -0.056 0.863  3.202***  12.04  -0.183 -0.624 -0.056 0.863 
Woman  0.383  1.49  -0.056 -0.086 0.090  0.052  0.383  1.41  -0.056 -0.086 0.090  0.052 
Age  -0.014***  -3.09 0.002 0.002 -0.003  -0.001  -0.014*** -4.90 0.002 0.002 -0.003  -0.001 
Party  Change  0.255**  2.08  -0.041 -0.051 0.061  0.031  0.255**  2.40  -0.041 -0.051 0.061  0.031 
chi2-stat energy resources  9.41**            25.16***                
Number  of  obs  466          466        
Prob>chi2  0.000          0.000         
Pseudo R2  0.364                 0.364                
Notes: Robust standard errors. Significance levels: * 0.05 < p < 0.10, ** 0.01 < p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Reference groups: PR; Left, Man, Not changed the party, 
Not a members of Duma’s energy policy committee. According to the Optimal Classification output, the algorithm converges to 0.02905 (3%) in error proportion, 
to 0.97095 (97%) in correct classification, to 0.87064 (66.2%) in APRE, and the Spearman correlation between the current legislator estimates and the previous 
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Table 4 
Probit Analysis of Roll Call Votes 
 
Second Duma – Parameter Estimates with Probit 
 Roll Call Vote No. 46300  
Third Duma – Parameter Estimates with Probit 
Roll Call Vote No. 129940 
Clustering on Russian Regions  Clustering on Russian 
Districts 
Clustering on Russian Regions  Clustering on Russian 
Districts 
Factors  Coeff.  z-Stat.      Marg. 
Effect  
Coeff.  z-Stat.  Coeff.  z-Stat.      Marg. 
Effect  
Coeff.  z-Stat.      
Oil  408.299**  1.96 0.016  408.299** 2.44  5.705  0.54 2.275  5.705**  2.08 
Gas  -283.014**  -2.10  -0.011  -283.014***  -2.64  0.007 0.01  0.003  0.007 0.02 
Electricity -11.495  -0.89  -5E-05  -11.495  -0.89  16.767*  1.90  6.687  16.767**  2.40 
Trade  Balance            -1E-06 -0.090  -6E-07  -1E-06 -0.140 
Committee 0.031  0.08  1E-06  0.031  0.08  0.180 0.47  0.072  0.180 0.45 
SMD 0.700  1.41  4E-05  0.700  1.37  -0.504**  -2.58  -0.199  -0.504***  -2.56 
Center  -2.694**** -15.98 -0.004  -2.694***  -15.50 3.050*** 16.25  0.828  3.050*** 19.95 
Independent  -2.835***  -5.03  -0.067  -2.835***  -5.56  2.581*** 3.79  0.514  2.581*** 6.05 
Woman  -0.838**  -2.33  -2E-04  -0.838***  -3.46  0.105 0.37  0.042  0.105 0.34 
Age  -0.061  -1.47  -2E-06  -0.061***  -2.81  0.079 1.03  0.032  0.079 0.99 
Age^2  0.001**  2.24  4E-08  0.001*** 3.88  -0.001 -0.92  -3E-04  -0.001 -0.87 
Party  Change  1.839*** 5.06 5E-05  1.839***  4.26  0.787***  2.85 0.296  0.787***  3.31 
chi2-stat energy resources  10.34**      21.80***    8.26**      9.34**   
Number of obs            303        303     366      366   
Prob>chi2  0.000        0.000     0.000        0.000    
Pseudo R2  0.557        0.557     0.547        0.547   
Notes: Robust standard errors. Significance levels: * 0.05 < p < 0.10, ** 0.01 < p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.  Reference groups: PR; Left, Man,  Not 




Political Parties in the State Duma of Russia between 1994 and 2003 
 
First Duma    
Political Parties  Proclaimed Ideology 
Choice of Russia  Right 
Women of Russia  Center 
Agrarian Party of Russia  Left 
Block “Yavlinskii-Boldyrev-Lukin”  Center 
Democratic Party of Russia  Right 
Deputy Group "Russia"  Center 
Deputy Group "Stability"  Center 
Communist Party of Russia  Left 
Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia  Right 
New Regional Policy -Duma 96  Center 
Party of Russian Unity and Agreement  Right 
Not affiliated with a fraction or grouping  Independent  
  
Second Duma    
Political Parties  Proclaimed Ideology 
Communist Party of Russia  Left 
Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia  Right 
Our Home-Russia  Center 
Yabloko Center 
Agrarian Deputy Group  Left 
Deputy Group "People's Power"  Left 
Deputy Group "Russian Regions"  Center 
Not affiliated with a fraction or grouping  Independent  
  
Third Duma    
Political Parties  Proclaimed Ideology 
Communist Party of Russia  Left 
Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia  Right 
Fatherland-All Russia  Center 
Union of Right Forces  Right 
Yabloko Center 
Agrarian-Industrial Deputy Group  Left 
Deputy Group "People's Deputy"  Center 
Deputy Group "Russian Regions"  Center 
Interregional Movement "Unity"  Center 




Parliamentary Committees in the State Duma of Russia between 1994 and 2003 
 
First Duma  Second Duma 
Committee Committee 
1.  Agrarian Issues  1.  Agrarian Issues 
2.  Security 2.  Security 
3.  Budget, Taxation, Banks and Finance  3.  Budget, Taxation, Banks and Finance 
4.  Geopolitics 4.  Geopolitics 
5.  Local Self-Government  5.  Local Self-Government 
6.  Women, Family and Youth  6.  Veterans  
7.  Nationalities 7.  Women, Family and Youth 
8.  Social groupings and Religious Organizations  8.  Nationalities 
9.  CIS affairs and contacts with compatriots  9.  Social groupings and Religious Organizations 
10.  Federal and regional affairs  10.  CIS affairs and contacts with compatriots 
11.  Legislation and judicial reform  11.  Federal and regional affairs 
12.  Media policy  12.  Legislation and judicial reform 
13.  International affairs  13.  Media policy 
14.  Defense 14.  Conversion and High Technologies  
15.  Education, culture and science  15.  International affairs 
16.  Work organization of the State Duma  16.  Culture  
17.  Health protection  17.  Defense 
18.  Natural resources and the environment  18.  Education and science 
19.  Industry, construction, transportation and energy  19.  Problems of the North  
20.  Property, privatization and economic activity  20.  Regulation and Work organization of the State Duma 
21.  Labor and social policy  21.  Health protection 
22.  Ecology 22.  Natural resources and the environment 
23.  Economic policy  23.  Industry, construction, transportation and energy 
 24.  Property, privatization and economic activity 
 25.  Labor and social policy 
 26.  Ecology 
 27.  Economic policy 
 28.  Tourism and Sport  
Third Duma   
Committee  
1.  Agrarian Issues   
2.  Security  
3.  Budget, and Taxation   
4.  State Construction    
5.  Local Self-Government   
6.  Veterans    
7.  Women, Family and Youth   
8.  Nationalities  
9.  Social groupings and Religious Organizations   
10.  CIS affairs and contacts with compatriots   
11.  Federal and regional affairs   
12.  Defense    
13.  Legislation and judicial reform   
14.  Mandate      37
15.  Credit  
16.  Culture    
17.  International Affairs    
18.  Education and science   
19.  Health protection   
20.  Problems of the North    
21.  Regulation and Work organization of the State 
Duma 
 
22.  Natural resources and the environment   
23.  Industry    
24.  Energy  
25.  Property, privatization and economic activity   
26.  Labor and social policy   
27.  Ecology  
28.  Economic policy   




Administrative Structure of Russian Federation: Districts, Republics, Krais and Oblasts (Part I) 
 
Northwestern District              Central District  Volga District  Southern District 
Arkhangel'skaya oblast'  Belgorodskaya oblast'  Republic Bashkortostan  Republic Adygeya 
Vologodskaya oblast'  Bryanskaya oblast'  Kirovskaya oblast'  Astrakhanskaya oblast' 
Kaliningradskaya oblast'  Vladimirskaya oblast'  Komi-Permyatskii AO  Volgogradskaya oblast' 
Republic Karelia  Voronezhskaya oblast'  Nizhegorodskaya oblast'  Republic Dagestan 
Republic Komi  Ivanovskaya oblast'  Orenburgskaya oblast'  Republic Ingushetiya 
Leningradskaya oblast'  Kaluzhskaya oblast'  Penzenskaya oblast'  Kabardino-Balkarskaya 
Republic 
Murmanskaya oblast'  Kostromskaya oblast'  Permskaya oblast'  Republic Kalmykiya 
Nenetskii AO  Kurskaya oblast'  Republic Marii El  Karachaevo-Cherkesskaya 
Republic 
Novgorodskaya oblast'  Lipetskaya oblast'  Republic Mordoviya  Krasnodarskii Krai 
Pskovskaya oblast'  Moskovskaya oblast'  Samarskaya oblast'  Rostovskaya oblast' 
City of St. Petersburg  Orlovskaya oblast'  Saratovskaya oblast'  Republic Severnaya Ossetiya 
  Ryazanskaya oblast'  Republic Tatarstan  Stavropol'skii Krai 
  Smolenskaya oblast'  Udmurtskaya Republic  Chechenskaya Republic 
 Tambovskaya  oblast'  Ul'yanovskaya  oblast'   
  Tverskaya oblast'  Chuvashskaya Republic   
 Tul'skaya  oblast'    
 Yaroslavskaya  oblast'    
  City of Moscow      
 
Table A4 
Administrative Structure of Russian Federation: Districts, Republics, Krais and Oblasts (Part II) 
 
Ural  District  Siberian District  Far Eastern District 
Kurganskaya oblast'  Aginskii Buryatskii AO  Amurskaya oblast' 
Sverdlovskaya oblast'  Republic Altai  Evreiskaya AR 
Tyumenskaya oblast'  Altaiskii Krai  Kamchatskaya oblast' 
Chelyabinskaya oblast'  Republic Buryatiya  Koryakskii AO   38
Khanty-Mansiiskii AO  Irkutskaya oblast'  Koryakskii AO 
Yamalo-Nenetskii AO  Kemerovskaya oblast'  Magadanskaya oblast' 
  Krasnoyarskii Krai  Chukotskii AO 
  Novosibirskaya oblast'  Primorskii Krai 
 Omskaya  oblast'  Sakhalinskaya  oblast' 
 Taimyrskii  AO  Khabarovskii  Krai 
  Tomskaya oblast'  Republic Sakha (Yakutiya) 
 Republic  Tyva   
 Ust'-Ordynskii  AO   
 Republic  Khakasiya   
 Chitinskaya  oblast'   
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Figure A2 























                                                 
 
i The information on energy roll calls between 1994 and 2003 relies on INDEM database 
materials and personal research in the archives of central Russian newspapers and journals. 
INDEM (Informatics for Democracy) is a non-profit organization of applied political research 
located in Moscow and its database includes all roll call votes held in the State Duma since its 
constitutional establishment in December 1993.   
ii For more details see www.duma.gov.ru.  
iii Besides this restriction we have some missing values for one of the independent variable (age) 
in the second (19 observations) and Third Duma (5 observations). The obtained results remain 
robust when omitting the age variable in the estimations.  
iv The quantitative information on regional energy production comes from the Federal Service of 
Statistics, known as Goskomstat. This is the official state provider of statistical information in 
Russian Federation. In this paper we use the 2003 edition of the statistical package on Russian 
Regions.   
v We slightly changed the structure of the specification due to the non-linear relationship 
between age and ranking. 
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